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The Public Trust Doctrine in
Public Land Law
By CHARLES F. WILKINSON*
The 700 million acres of federal land-almost one-third of all
land in the country"-have come to play an increasingly central
role in the nation's economy and society. These public lands and
the resources on and under them contain economic wealth that
is literally beyond our capacity to measure. Hardrock minerals
-gold, silver, uranium, molybdenum and many others-are be-
ing produced at accelerating rates from federal holdings.2 Fed-
eral coal, oil and synthetic fuel minerals such as oil shale have
* Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Oregon. B.A. 1963, Denison
University; LL.B. 1966, Stanford University. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the diligent and able research assistance of Barbara A. Haslinger, Daniel
W. Hester and Russell B. West.
I See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC
LAND STATISTICS 10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS]. The
characterization that one-third of the nation's land is federal land may be mis-
leading, since public lands are heavily concentrated in the West. Breaking
down the gross statistics, public lands constitute 90.5% of the land in Alaska;
47.9% of the land in the "eleven western states" (Arizona, California, Colo-
rado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington and
Wyoming); and 4.3% of the land in the remaining 38 states. Id.
2 E.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MANAGEMENT OF FUEL AND
NoNFuEL MINERALS IN FEDERAL LAND 5 (1979):
[T]he Federal land is concentrated in the areas considered to be
most favorable for the occurrence of economic mineralization. Most
domestic nonfuel mineral production has come from federal land
areas, which contain the bulk of the known domestic resources of a
majority of the metallic minerals.
See also U.S. GENuRAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MINING LAW REFORM AND BAL-
ANCED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 2 (1979):
[P]resent knowledge about the geological content, combined with
the geographic pattern of established mining districts, indicates
that the public land areas of the West generally hold greater prom-
ise for future [hardrock] mineral discoveries than any other region.
From the standpoint of current and projected mineral availability
in the United States, the Federal Lands play a vital role.
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recently come to be viewed as integral to any reasoned solution
to our energy problems.3 Federal range lands provide a signifi-
cant part of the forage for livestock in the West.4 The public
timber inventory includes over half of the nation's softwood tim-
ber,' and the annual harvest from these lands, some of them
among the most productive in the world, has multiplied several
S Because of the concentration of many fuel minerals on the public lands,
the rate of exploitation of public land resources will be a critical issue in our
national energy policy. For example, "About half of Alaska's undiscovered po-
tential crude oil and natural gas resources are estimated to be on Federal land.
Approximately 28 percent and 31 percent of the identified crude oil and natu-
ral gas resources, respectively, in the 11 western states are on Federal land."
See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MANAGEMENT OF FUEL AND NONFUEL
MINERALS IN FEDERAL LAND 314 (1979). The public lands also contain 35% of
the nation's coal supply. Id. at 298. Coal production on the public lands has
increased dramatically in recent years, from 7,059,093 short tons in 1967, Bu-
REAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATIS-
Tics 84 (1967), to 50,196,779 short tons in 1977. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra
note 1, at 104. "As of September 30, 1979, there were 546 federal coal leases
which were estimated to contain approximately 17 billion tons of recoverable
reserves." SECRETARY OF INTERIOR, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL COAL
MANAGEMENT REP., App. A, at A-1 (1980) (ANNUAL REPORT under § 8 of the
Federal Coal Leasing 1980 Amendments Act of 1976).
Fully 80% of the nation's most valuable oil shale deposits are located on
public lands. "Approximately seventy-five percent of the known U.S. oil shale
deposits are concentrated within a 1,350-square-mile area of the Piceance
Creek Basin in the Parachute Creek member of the Green River Formation in
northwestern Colorado. Within this area, federally owned land contains 1.1
trillion barrels of oil." Moffett, Federal Oil Shale Policy: An Analysis of De-
velopment Alternatives, 13 Hous. L. REv. 701, 703 (1976).
For an analysis of the increased emphasis on coal and oil shale as a result of
former President Carter's energy program, see Comment, Environmental Im-
plications of a Synthetic Fuel Industry, 4 HARv. ENVT'L L. REV. 391 (1980).
" In 1976 the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) reported that 7,981 graz-
ing leases were in force involving 17,121,676 acres of federal land. This land
accommodated 2,322,669 head of cattle, 2,976,321 sheep and goats and 15,715
horses. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 1, Table 60 at 89, Table 65 at 93.
The public lands account for about three percent of all the forage consumed by
livestock in the United States. The greatest impact is in the West, where pub-
lic lands supply 12% of the total forage. See PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COM-
MISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 105 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PL-
LRC REP.].
1 The national forests contain only 18% of the nation's commercial forest
land but, due to dense, old-growth stands of large trees, account for 51% of the
softwood timber inventory. Other federal agencies, principally the BLM, hold
another 12% of our softwood saw timber inventory. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICUL-
TURE, FOREST SERVICE STATISTICS OF THE U.S., Table 13 at 40 (1977).
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times over during the last quarter of a century.6
The non-economic resources on the public lands are no less
important. Many species of wild animals depend on the prime
wildlife habitats found on the federal lands. Most of the snow
pack in the western United States is on the public lands, provid-
ing scarce water supplies for all of the economic and non-eco-
nomic resources.8 The national scenic wonders, many so famous
that they need not even be identified, attract several times more
visitors today than even a generation ago.9 Congress, which in
6 Historically, the public forest lands have made a relatively modest contri-
bution to the nation's timber harvest. In 1920 the national forests provided
only 1.4% of the 59.2-billion-board-feet national harvest. In 1940 the national
forests supplied only 3.2% of the nationwide timber production of 54.3 billion
board feet. Since the Second World War, however, the national forests have
provided an increasing share of the total national softwood production. In 1970
the national forests accounted for 18% of the domestic timber production of
59.1 billion board feet. See generally G. ROBINSON, THE FOREST SERVICE 14
(1975); D. BARNEY, THE LAST STAND 18-19 (1974); West Virginia Div. of the
Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 955 (4th Cir.
1975).
It has been suggested that the "central policy issue" for meeting future
demand for wood is the rate at which "old growth inventory on the national
forests [should] be converted to well-managed new stands to meet both current
and future timber needs." REPORT OF THE PESmENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON
TIMBER AND THE ENVIRONMENT 9 (1973).
7 The BLM estimates that the public lands are used by 45,290 bighorn
sheep, 230,000 caribou, 104,283 elk, 82,151 moose, 8,235 mountain goats, and
1,196,739 deer. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 1, Table 56 at 83. Professor
Swanson has stated that without public lands the future of wildlife in the
United States would be "very grim." Swanson, Wildlife on the Public Lands,
in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 428 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978).
o Because federal reservations are normally found in the uplands of
the Western States rather than the flatlands, the percentage of
water flow originating in or flowing through the reservations is even
more impressive [than the percentage of land owned by the federal
government]. More than 60% of the average annual water yield in
the 11 Western States is from federal reservations.
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 n.3 (1978).
9 Between 1960 and 1978, for example, visits to the national park system
increased by 357%. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 239, Table 398 (1979). See generally J.
SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HAnDRAnS (1981); Twight & Cotton, The Politics of
Images: Forest Managers vs. Recreation Publics, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 297
(1975); Sax, Buying Scenery: Land Acquisitions for the National Park Ser-
vice, 1980 DUKE L.J. 709. See also U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
supra note 2, at 5: "Initially as a result of historical accident and subsequently
19801
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the 19th century pioneered an international movement to set
aside national parks for recreation,"0 has now gone a step far-
ther: during the last seventeen years the United States has es-
tablished far and away the largest governmentally designated
system of wild areas in the world."'
The last ten years have been marked by a burgeoning number
of conflicts among the many groups that compete for the finite
quantity of federal land and resources. Pressure from these con-
flicts focuses most directly on the four major resource agencies
that administer the bulk of the federal holdings. Three are in
the Department of Interior. The Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) is responsible for most of the public lands-about 450
million acres. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is also housed
in the Department of the Interior, as is the National Park Ser-
vice. The oldest land management agency, the Forest Service, is
located in the Department of Agriculture and has responsibility
for about 187 million acres.
The Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service
have had, and will continue to have, their share of controversy.
Their dominant-use statutes, however, provide relatively specific
management standards.12 The greatest challenge for coordinated
management of economic and non-economic resources occurs on
the multiple-use lands held by the Forest Service and the BLM.
It is there, where even recently enacted statutory guidance
by design, the federal government became the owner (in trust for the public) of
the Nation's most important and unique nonmineral resources, particularly the
non-commercial ones. The Government's holdings of such resources are now
among the most significant in the world."
10 The world's first large-scale reservation of lands for public recreation oc-
curred in 1872 when Yellowstone National Park was withdrawn from settle-
ment and reserved as a "pleasuring ground for the benefit and enjoyment of
the people." Act of March 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32. See generally R. NASH,
WILDERNESS AND TH AMEcAN MIND 108-21 (1967). See also R. CARRINGTON,
GREAT NATIONAL PARKS OF THE WORLD 14-15 (1967): "The concept of national
parks as we know them today, and all the most energetic and effective pioneer-
ing work in establishing human attitudes towards them, is one of the many
debts the world owes to the United States.... Since 1872 the national park
movement has spread to all countries."
" J. HENDE:E, G. STANKEY & R. LuCAS, WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT (1978).
Is E.g., National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18f (1976);
National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 668dd-668ee (1976 & Supp. m 1979).
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remains comparatively opaque,18 that the crunch will come. But
on all of the land systems, litigants of every stripe can be ex-
pected to turn with increasing frequency to the public trust doc-
trine to resolve the close questions.
The federal public lands are at the outer reaches of the public
trust doctrine. Analysis should fairly begin with a statement by
the Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois."
The Court said that the doctrine, in its classic form, operates as
a bar against the large-scale disposition of lands under navigable
waterways.15 In dictum, the Court added that title to land under
navigable waterways is "different from the title the United
States holds in the public lands which are open to pre-emption
and sale."' 6 That language amounts to a clear finding that the
classic public trust doctrine does not operate on the inland pub-
lic lands.'1 Put another way, inland federal lands are not "trust
" National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90
Stat. 2949 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1976) and scattered sections of
16 U.S.C.); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), Pub.
L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976) and
scattered sections of 7, 16, 30 & 40 U.S.C.).
14 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
15 E.g., id. at 455-56:
The trust with which [lands under navigable waterways] are held,
therefore, is governmental and cannot be alienated, except in those
instances mentioned of parcels used in the improvement of the in-
terest thus held, or when parcels can be disposed of without detri-
ment to the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.
This statement, like others in the opinion indicating that trust resources could
not be alienated by the legislature, was dictum. The Court did not have to rule
on the validity of the original grant to the railroad; Illinois had revoked the
grant, and the Court upheld the revocation. For a full discussion of the case,
see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judi-
cial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. Rzv. 471, 489-91 (1970).
" Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). By "sale" the Court
was probably referring to the several homesteading laws; "pre-emption" in this
context is the preferential right, based on various statutes, of a settler to a
patent based on his or her good-faith squatting on land before the area was
opened for homesteading. See authorities cited in note 101 infra.
" The phrase "inland public lands" is used here to describe all public lands
not under navigable watercourses. In practical terms, almost all public lands
are inland public lands, since former public lands under navigable water-
courses were transferred to new states at the time of statehood pursuant to the
equal footing doctrine. See text accompanying notes 38-41 infra. The United
States has since reacquired some lands under navigable watercourses, however,
to which the doctrine presumably applies. See note 145 infra.
19801 273
University of California, Davis
resources" according to the classic formulation of the doctrine."8
The Illinois Central dictum is due in part to the fact that the
public lands can be distinguished from other lands on which
trusts have traditionally been impressed. Lands analogous to the
modern federal public lands were not impressed with a trust at
common law.19 The inland lands of the Crown were not trust
resources.' 0 They were not limited by the restraints of the jus
publicum, the public right, and were subject only to the jus
privatum, the right of the Crown to manage them, to own them
and to convey them without the restrictions of the trust.21 Thus
the common law trust is not direct authority for the existence of
the public trust on the inland public lands.
Although the United States holds Indian lands in trust,"2 a
is A major part of the expansion of the public trust doctrine has occurred in
the evolution of what might be called "trust resources." At common law the
trust applied only to tidal waters. See generally H. ALTHAUS, PUBLIc TRUST
RIGHTS 1-70 (1978). See also note 20 infra. In this country the doctrine was
first expanded to include all navigable waterways as trust resources. See
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (public trust doctrine
applies to land under navigable lakes); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 46
(1893). In some jurisdictions the doctrine has also been found to protect re-
sources such as parklands, wildlife, nonnavigable watercourses and air. See
generally W. RODGERS, ENV[iRONmENTAL LAW 170-86 (1977).
This article uses the phrase "classic public trust doctrine" to refer to the
doctrine as applied in Illinois Central, i.e., as a limitation on the transfer by
states of large amounts of land under navigable watercourses.
" See note 18 supra.
"0 Upon the Norman conquest in 1066, the title to all English lands in effect
vested in the new king, William. Both inland and coastal lands were routinely
granted by the Crown to private owners. As to the coastal grants, however, a
presumption arose that the Crown's conveyance did not include title to lands
under tidal waters. See H. ALTHAus, supra note 18, at 37; 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS 246 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Sax, supra note 15, at 475.
" The Crown was recognized as holding two interests in its tidelands: an
alienable private right or jus privatum, as well as an inalienable public right or
jus publicum. This public right guaranteed the people interests such as naviga-
tion, commerce and fishing. No analogous ppblic right attached to the inland
lands of the Crown. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1893); 1 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 246-47; Fraser, Title to the Soil Under
Public Waters-A Question of Fact (pt. 1), 2 MINN. L. REv. 313, 319-22 (1918).
See also Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 466 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
" The United States holds legal title to most tribal lands, but the right to
the beneficial use and occupancy of these lands is in the respective tribes. E.g.,
United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111 (1938). In some cases
land is held in fee by the tribes, but a trust relationship still exists, and aliena-
tion is subject to the consent of the United States. United States v. Candelaria,
[Vol. 14
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number of factors make those lands very different from the pub-
lic lands. The Supreme Court has recognized the special obliga-
tions to Indian tribes in opinions dating at least to 1831.'1 Also,
the trust obligations to Indians trace to specific documents:
Indian relations were normally established by bilateral treaties
or other negotiations." Finally, Indian lands are not public
lands.'5 Congress, although a public body, has essentially private
obligations toward Indian lands, and those private obligations
run to specific parties - Indian tribes and individuals.' There
271 U.S. 432 (1926); 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976).
In arguing for the public trust doctrine in public land law, some have analo-
gized the public lands to Indian lands. E.g., Sierra Club v. Department of Inte-
rior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 95 (N.D. Cal. 1974), discussed in notes 62-79 and accom-
panying text infra; Note, Proprietary Duties of the Federal Government
Under the Public Land Trust, 75 MICH. L. REv. 586, 591 (1977).
29 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), was the first Su-
preme Court case to speak of the federal government's trust responsibilities to
Indian tribes. In Cherokee Nation the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall, held that Indian tribes are not "foreign states" within the meaning
of the judicial review provisions of art. 3, § 2 of the Constitution. Rather, Mar-
shall said, tribes are best described as "'domestic dependent nations' whose
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." 30 U.S.
at 17; see, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 541 (1974). See generally
Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975). The Indian trust obligation ultimately
derives from the special place of aboriginal people in international jurispru-
dence. See genereally McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty: Accommo-
dating Tribal, State, and Federal Interests, 13 HAav. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 357,
360-65, 367-76 (1978).
2'4 See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (agreement negoti-
ated between tribe and administrative officials later approved by Congress in
the form of a statute); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)
(treaty). The Indian trust relationship was sometimes established by unilateral
executive order. E.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F.
Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
25 F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL IwrDuN LAW, Ch. 3, Sec. A n.19 (3d ed.
1981). In Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919), the Supreme
Court indicated that lands held by the United States in trust for a tribe are
not public lands and that therefore they are not subject to disposition under
the general public land laws. Id. at 113. But see Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593
(10th Cir. 1972), where the court, in holding that Indian lands are subject to
the National Environmental Policy Act, appeared to confuse Indian lands with
public lands. Id. at 597.
26 E.g., Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1966);
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C.
1973).
19801 275
University of California, Davis
is no general public obligation. The differences run too deep for
the Indian trust to be more than an analogue for the public trust
doctrine on the public lands.
In addition to the lack of direct support in either common law
or Indian law, there are a number of compelling policy reasons
supporting the conclusion that the public trust doctrine, at least
in its classic form, does not apply to the public lands. First, the
history of public land policy denies the existence of any prohibi-
tion against disposition of federal lands. Until recently, the pub-
lic lands were sold or otherwise transferred away as the central
method of opening the American West for settlement.2 No
serious suggestion could be made that private title to some 1.4
billion acres is clouded due to the United States' inability to
convey clear title. Second, public land law is a heavily statutory
field.'8 The legislative matrix is sufficiently comprehensive that
doubts can fairly be raised as to whether there is room for a
broad, common law doctrine to operate.
Another basis for objection arises from the diversity of the
public lands. These resources fill the spectrum of geographical
characteristics found in North America: the public lands are
high and low, wet and arid, hot and cold, coastal and inland,
mineral and non-mineral, scenic and plain, timbered and barren,
checkerboarded and contiguous. 9 In addition to geographical di-
versity, the four major land-management agencies have substan-
tially different organic acts. 0 For example, it is one thing to re-
fer to the dominant-use National Park Service as a trustee; it is
a far different matter to place traditional trust obligations on
the BLM, which must reconcile the congressionally sanctioned
multiple-use tug and pull among economic and non-economic
uses. This range of geographic and legal diversity makes it diffi-
cult to apply a single, unitary doctrine to all of the public lands.
Finally, while there may be majesty aplenty on the public
lands, there are many, even in these land-appreciative days, who
would say that most of the public land holdings are common,
even mundane.81 Historically, there is justification for such a
27 See generally G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RE-
SOURCES LAW 43-119 (1981).
11 See notes 101-129 and accompanying text infra.
2 E.g., PLLRC Rzp., supra note 4, at 22.
,o See notes 12-13 supra.
31 In terms of acreage, the largest amounts of public lands are remote lands
276 [Vol. 14
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conclusion. Most of the public lands are literally leftovers-
lands no one wanted to homestead, stake a mining claim on, or
set aside for the value of their scenery or wildlife. Logically, such
lands may not be a proper subject for a trust.
In spite of these factors, there is an imposing and growing
body of case law suggesting that the public trust doctrine applies
to the public lands."2 Many of these cases use trust language
in Alaska. The area between the Sierra Nevada and the 100th Meridian was
often described by early settlers as "the Great American Desert." See R.
ATHEARN, HIGH COuNTRY Empmn 18-23 (1965). For a considerably more loving
perspective, see T. WATKINS & C. WATSON, THE LAND No ONE KNOWS: AMERICA
AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1975).
32 See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976); Ivanhoe Irriga-
tion Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958); Alabama v. Texas, 347
U.S. 272, 273-74, 277 (1954) (per curiam); United States v. California, 332 U.S.
19, 40 (1947); United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16,
28-29 (1940); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409
(1917); Causey v. United States, 240 U.S. 399, 402 (1916); Light v. United
States, 220 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1911); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518,
524 (1897); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 178, 181 (1891);
United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890); United
States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 448 (1856); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 221-22, 224
-(1845); United States v. Hughes, 626 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1980);
Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd,
100 S. Ct. 1593 (1980); Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 890, 892 (1st
Cir. 1979); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1067 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United
States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1978); West Virginia Div. of
Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 955 (4th Cir.
1975); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 891 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir.
1972); Hannifin v. Morton, 444 F.2d 200, 202 (10th Cir. 1971); Beaver v. United
States, 350 F.2d 4, 8 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 937 (1966); Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649, 655 (10th Cir. 1960); United States
v. West, 232 F.2d 694, 696-99 (9th Cir. 1956); Forbes v. United States, 125 F.2d
404, 408 (9th Cir. 1942); United States ex rel. Roughton v. Ickes, 101 F.2d 248,
252-53 (D. C. Cir. 1938); In re Stuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 39-40 (E.D.
Va. 1980); Friends of Yosemite v. Frizzell, 420 F. Supp. 390, 393 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal.
1975); Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 93, 95-96 (N.D.
Cal. 1974); Stewart v. Penny, 238 F. Supp. 821, 827 (D. Nev. 1965); United
States v. Blaylock, 159 F. Supp. 874, 877 (N.D. Cal. 1958); United States v.
Thompson, 41 F. Supp. 13, 15-16 (E.D. Wash. 1941).
In addition to this body of case law, two articles have analyzed the question
of whether the public trust doctrine applies to the federal lands. See Mont-
gomery, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law: Its Application to
University of California, Davis
only in passing and with little analytical content. Nevertheless,
the teaching of existing law seems to be that public land law has
borrowed important components from the public trust doctrine.
Although the obligations of Congress and federal agencies are
plainly different from the duties of states when they act as trust-
ees of navigable waterways, public trust notions have charged
and vitalized public land law, particularly in the modern era.
This article will first discuss whether or not the trust exists on
the public lands. It will then examine the scope and content of
the doctrine in public land law and suggest some likely applica-
tions of the doctrine in the future.
I. THE EXISTENCE OF THE TRUST
A. Judicial Precedent
The disparate opinions on the existence of the trust can be
grouped into three historical eras, each with different character-
istics. In effect, there have been different public trusts at differ-
ent times, as trust notions have evolved to meet changing needs
and attitudes.
1. The Public Trust Doctrine as an Obligation to the
States
The original states reserved title to lands within their borders,
so that the first major federal acquisitions of land were by way
of cessions by the original states of claims beyond their western
boundaries." Federal land holdings were viewed primarily as a
potential source of revenue. Auctions were held to generate
funds for the treasury." Scrip entitling veterans and others to
homesteads was used in lieu of cash payments." It was always
anticipated that new states would be created in the western ar-
eas where the public lands were located.8 6 In this context it was
natural that the courts in the mid-19th century, in developing
legal doctrine in public land law, would stress the obligations of
the Judicial Review of Land Classification Decisions, 8 WILLAME'rE L.J. 135
(1972); Note, Proprietary Duties of the Federal Government Under the Public
Land Trust, 75 MICH. L. Rzv. 586 (1977).
P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAN LAW DEVELOPMENT 49-57 (1968).
See B. HiBBARD, A HISTORY O PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 1-6 (1965).
" Id. at 117-29.
P. GATES, supra note 33, at 73-74.
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the federal government and the primacy of state and private
interests.
The Supreme Court in Pollard v. Hagan 7 took such a posi-
tion. The case involved a title dispute, with the plaintiff claim-
ing land below the high watermark of a navigable freshwater
river. The land was within the state of Alabama, having earlier
been ceded to the United States by Virginia and Georgia. Plain-
tiff's title was based on a federal patent issued after statehood.
The Court, invoking the equal footing doctrine, concluded that
the lands below the high water mark of navigable watercourses
passed to the new states at statehood."' Thus the federal govern-
ment had no title to convey, and its patent to the plaintiff was a
nullity.
The Court also expounded upon the nature of title to the
public lands. As to lands under navigable waterways, the United
States held only temporary possession during territorial days,
since such lands were to be transferred upon statehood.3 9 As to
the inland public lands, which did not pass from federal owner-
ship at statehood, the Court said that the United States held
such lands in "trust. '40 The object of the trust was to
convert the land into money for the payment of the debt, and to
erect new states over the territory thus ceded; and as soon as these
purposes could be accomplished, the power of the United States
over these lands, as property, was to cease.
Whenever the United States shall have fully executed these
trusts, the municipal sovereignty of the new state will be complete
41
While the analysis in Pollard involved land subject to cessions
from Virginia and Georgia to the United States, the dictum con-
cerning the inland public lands does not seem to be limited to
those cessions. In fact, later cases failed to distinguish between
lands ceded from the original states and lands ceded from for-
"1 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
" Id. at 229. See also 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 250-
52.
3' Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 221 (1845).
410 Id. at 222.
41 Id. at 224. This reasoning is reflected in cases before and after Pollard.
See Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873); Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
367 (1842); New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836); Hicks
v. Bell, 3 Cal. 219 (1853).
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eign nations, and applied these trust notions to all inland federal
lands, however acquired.42 The United States was thus consid-
ered merely a temporary custodian and trustee in the mid-19th
century. Its trust duty was to sell off the lands for the common
benefit so that new states, with land in private ownership, could
operate as sovereigns on an equal footing with the original states
and not as "colonies. 43
2. The Public Trust Doctrine as a Source of Federal Power
During the last quarter of the 19th century, federal policy to-
ward the public lands began to take on a new cast. The former
premises were revised, at least in part. Separate movements be-
gan to keep some recreation, timber, water, grazing and mineral
resources in federal hands. A consensus developed that those
particular lands and resources should not be subject to random
disposal but rather should be protected and managed by the
United States for future generations." As Congress and the
'2 In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), for example, the
Supreme Court, in discussing the government's power to acquire land from
foreign nations and to govern new territories, said:
The power to expand the territory of the United States by the ad-
mission of new States is plainly given; and in the construction of
this power by all the departments of the Government, it has been
held to authorize the acquisition of territory, not fit for admission
at the time, but to be admitted as soon as its population and situa-
tion would entitle it to admission. It is acquired to become a State,
and not to be held as a colony ....
Id. at 447. Further, the Court noted that new territory is "acquired by the
General Government, as the representative and trustee of the people of the
United States, and it must therefore be held in that character for their con-
mon and equal benefit... ." Id. at 448. See also Engdahl, State and Federal
Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIz. L. REV. 283, 293-96 (1976); Patterson,
The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories and the States in
Landholding, 28 TEX. L. Rv. 43, 50 (1949).
's Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 447, 448 (1856).
" See notes 109-113 and accompanying text infra. See generally S. DANA &
S. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY 69-119 (1980); G. COGGINS & C. WILKIN-
SON, supra note 27, at 119-39. The beginning of the policy of reservation may
have been the establishment of Yellowstone National Park in 1872. Act of
March 1, 1872, ch. 24, § 1, 17 Stat. 32 (1872) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1976)).
This shift in federal policy has been recognized by the Bureau of Land
Management:
During our years as a Nation, the attitude toward the public lands
has moved from a philosophy of disposal and settlement to a con-
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administrative agencies took action in this new direction, the
courts were required to fashion new rules to fit a more assertive
policy and legal framework. Again the courts turned to the trust
concept.
During this second era, from about 1888 through 1970, there
were some eighteen opinions4' in public land law using trust lan-
guage to describe the role of the United States. These opinions,
most of them by the Supreme Court, are especially pertinent to
an understanding of modern doctrine because courts have re-
cently applied the trust language in these older opinions to con-
temporary issues.46
In each of these older cases, the trust duty to the public was
used to justify plenary federal power to protect the public lands.
But while the trust vested power in the United States, it did not
seem to impose any reciprocal duties or obligations.
The use of the public trust to justify broad federal authority
over the public lands was reflected in the development of several
cept of retention and multiple-use management. It seems certain
that these trends are going to continue. The public lands were once
counted only in terms of mineral, timber, and grazing values. While
these values will be treasured even more in future years, the land's
greatest potential may likely be a wealth of yet to be discovered
opportunities, as well as acknowledgment of historical, cultural and
scientific values, or even isolation and outdoor recreation. The very
existence of these lands, held in trust for all the people, and for all
time, may be their greatest value.
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PROMISE OF THE
LAND 36, 37 (1979).
,5 Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. M;Cracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958);
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947); United States v. City &
County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 28-29 (1940); Utah Power & Light Co. v.
United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917); Causey v. United States, 240 U.S. 399,
402 (1916); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1911); Camfield v.
United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n,
142 U.S. 161, 178, 181 (1891); United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co.,
137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888);
Beaver v. United States, 350 F.2d 4, 8 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
937 (1966); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649, 655 (10th Cir.
1960); United States v. West, 232 F.2d 694, 696-99 (9th Cir. 1956); Forbes v.
United States, 125 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1942); United States ex rel.
Roughton v. Ickes, 101 F.2d 248, 252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Stewart v. Penny, 238
F. Supp. 821, 827 (D. Nev. 1965); United States v. Blaylock, 159 F. Supp. 874,
877 (N.D. Cal. 1958); United States v. Thompson, 41 F. Supp. 13, 15-16 (E.D.
Wash. 1941).
46 See, e.g., notes 62-79 and accompanying text infra.
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discrete principles of public land law. First, and perhaps most
basic, federal land management agencies were viewed, in the
formative years of administrative law, as being proper recipients
of broad-based delegations of authority from Congress. The
leading case is Light v. United States,7 which involved Forest
Service regulations requiring the issuance of a permit and the
payment of a fee before grazing would be allowed in national
forests. Justice Lamar reasoned that "the public lands are held
in trust for all the people of the United States'" and that "the
Government is charged with the duty and clothed with the
power to protect the public domain from trespass and unlawful
appropriation.'9 The Court upheld the regulations and ruled
that an injunction to prevent a rancher from violating these reg-
ulations would properly issue.
Light is a cornerstone of broad federal management authority
over the public lands. The opinion is especially noteworthy, par-
ticularly considering the era in which it was handed down,50 be-
cause it gave effect to federal regulations that were directly con-
trary to state law.51 It thus foreshadowed recent cases
establishing federal preemptive authority over state law on the
public lands under the Property Clause.2 At the time of the de-
cision in Light, however, the Property Clause had been infre-
quently relied upon, and the Court invoked the public trust doc-
trine as a source of congressional power over the public lands.
Trust language was also used as the philosophical basis for the
development of the rule that the doctrines of laches and estop-
pel do not ordinarily apply as against the federal government."
4" 220 U.S. 523 (1911). See also United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506
(1911).
4 Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911).
49 Id. at 536.
1* See Engdahl, supra note 42, at 288-310.
51 Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911). As was common in
western states, Colorado, where Light arose, required that ranchers erect
fences to keep other ranchers' stock out. The Court's ruling in Light allowed
federal law to override local law by upholding a trespass action by a landowner,
i.e., the United States, without fences.
51 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S.
529 (1976); Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979),
aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 1593 (1980).
5 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947) (estoppel cannot pre-
vent the United States from asserting its superior title to lands under the Pa-
cific Ocean); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409
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The rationale was that, since lands were held in trust for all of
the people, the conduct of a single federal official should not re-
sult in harm to the public."
In addition to these substantive uses of trust language, several
cases during this period used the trust concept incidentally in
developing other doctrines supporting federal power. For exam-
ple, trust notions were used to permit relief against persons who
were blocking access to, or otherwise damaging, the federal
lands. Courts also upheld a broad right on behalf of the United
States to protect the public interest by contesting land patents
procured by fraud.5 6 The trust was employed in cases allowing
the United States to institute trespass actions.5 7 Finally, there
(1917) (no estoppel against government when it is suing to enjoin unauthorized
use of the public lands); United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S.
160, 170 (1890) (maxim that those who seek equity must do equity not applica-
ble to a government action to set aside a fraudulently obtained patent); United
States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 341, 343 (1888) (no estoppel against government
when it is suing to set aside a fraudulently obtained patent); Beaver v. United
States, 350 F.2d 4, 8 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 937 (1966) (federal
government's title to land formed by accretion cannot be lost through laches or
neglect of duty); United States v. Blaylock, 159 F. Supp. 874, 877 (N.D. Cal.
1958) (laches cannot prevent the federal government from reforming a patent).
o4 See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917), in
which the Court rejected an estoppel argument saying, "As a general rule
laches or neglect of duty on the part of officers of the government is no defense
to a suit by it to enforce a public right or protect a public interest." Id. at 409.
The Court reasoned that "[a] suit by the United States to enforce and main-
tain its policy respecting lands which it holds in trust for all the people stands
upon a different plane. . . from the ordinary private suit to regain the title to
real property or to remove a cloud from it." Id. at 409.
" Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897) (upholding authority
of Congress to prohibit the erection of fences on private land that would have
the effect of enclosing public lands); United States v. West, 232 F.2d 694, 696-
99 (9th Cir. 1956) (government could enjoin grazing that had not been statuto-
rily authorized); Forbes v. United States, 125 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1942)
(Secretary of Interior had authority to order an abandoned well, located on
public lands, to be capped at the expense of a permittee); United States v.
Thompson, 41 F. Supp. 13, 15-16 (E.D. Wash. 1941) (Secretary of Interior had
authority to promulgate regulations governing grazing of livestock on the pub-
lic lands).
" E.g., United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888) (government had
authority to sue patentee to set aside fraudulently obtained patent). See also
Causey v. United States, 240 U.S. 399, 402 (1916); United States v. Trinidad
Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Pier-
son, 284 F.2d 649, 655 (10th Cir. 1960).
57 Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917) (up-
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were several miscellaneous uses of trust language to support fed-
eral prerogatives."
Thus the cases during this second era stand for a variety of
specific propositions. The common thread is that the trust con-
cept was used to reach results in favor of the United States, that
is, to create and reinforce federal powers.
3. The Public Trust Doctrine as a Source of Public Rights
The third era, which began in about 1970, stands in marked
contrast to the first two.5 ' It involves the direct or indirect use of
the public trust doctrine to limit federal power and to justify
rights of the public against the federal government. The heart of
the public trust doctrine, however it may be articulated, is that
it imposes limits and obligations on governments." Several mod-
holding injunction against unauthorized use of public lands for the generation
and distribution of power); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536, 537
(1911); see notes 47-52 and accompanying text supra.
" Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958) (Con-
gress can constitutionally limit the acreage to which federal reclamation pro-
ject water may be applied); United States v. City & County of San Francisco,
310 U.S. 16, 28, 29 (1940) (Congress can require power generated on the public
lands to be sold directly to consumers); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n,
142 U.S. 161, 178, 181 (1891) (Secretary of Interior, as guardian of the public
lands, has authority to set aside a land survey); United States ex rel. Roughton
v. Ickes, 101 F.2d 248, 252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (Secretary of Interior cannot be
compelled to issue oil and gas prospecting lease); Stewart v. Penny, 238 F.
Supp. 821, 827 (D. Nev. 1965) (Secretary of Interior has broad discretion to
grant land patents).
5 Federal cases using trust language after 1970 include Kleppe v. New Mex-
ico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976); United States v. Hughes, 626 F.2d 619, 621
(9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, 611 F.2d 1277, 1283-84
(9th Cir. 1980); Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 890, 892 (1st Cir.
1979); Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 1979),
aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 1593 (1980); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1067 n.8 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1978);
West Virginia Div. of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d
945, 955 (4th Cir. 1975); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 891 (D.C.
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d
593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972); Hannifin v. Morton, 444 F.2d 200, 202 (10th Cir.
1971); In re Stuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 39-40 (E.D. Va. 1980);
Friends of Yosemite v. Frizzell, 420 F. Supp. 390, 392 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sierra
Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra
Club v. Department of Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 93, 95-96 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
"o These limitations are illustrated by Gould v. Greylock Reservation
Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966) (lease by a state park manage-
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ern cases in public land law have dealt squarely with this con-
cept in a way that the older cases did not.61
The leading authorities in support of the public trust doctrine
as a limit on the government are the first two opinions by the
district court in the Redwood National Park litigation." The lit-
ment agency for large commercial skiing development struck down because the
agency had exceeded its statutory authorization); and City of Berkeley v. Su-
perior Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr.
327, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980) (statute authorizing the transfer of
lands strictly construed to protect the public's interest in tidelands). See also,
e.g., Sax, supra note 15, at 477 (listing traditional types of restrictions imposed
by the public trust on governmental authority); W. RODGERS, supra note 18, at
180-82 (characterizing limits of doctrine as amounting to "no significant deteri-
oration of public rights in public resources").
61 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979); West
Virginia Div. of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945
(4th Cir. 1975); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). On the other hand, several of the recent
cases used the trust as in the second era, i.e., to support federal prerogatives.
See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, (1976) (broad federal preemp-
tive power); United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1978) (no estop-
pel against federal administrative officials).
' Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal.
1974); Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal.
1975), Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal.
1976). The litigation involved a Sierra Club request that the Department of
Interior, acting through the National Park Service, use its powers to prevent
damage allegedly caused by logging operations occurring on lands adjacent to
and upstream of the park.
The first Redwood National Park decision was in response to defendant's
motion to dismiss Sierra Club's amended complaint and, alternatively, for
summary judgment. The court found that the Secretary of Interior had general
fiduciary obligations over the public lands and specific statutory directives,
both in the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18f
(1976), and the Redwood National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79j (1976 &
Supp. III 1979), to preserve the park's resources. 376 F. Supp. at 93-94. The
court denied defendant's motions on the ground that the plaintiff had stated a
claim for relief to the effect that the Secretary's inaction violated these trust
and statutory obligations. Id. at 95-96.
The second Redwood National Park decision went to the merits of the case.
The opinion surveyed the statutory provisions for park protection in the Red-
wood National Park Act and discussed the five studies conducted by the De-
partment of Interior on the actual and threatened damage to the park by log-
ging operations on adjacent lands. The studies concluded that there was
considerable potential for destruction of park resources in the immediate fu-
ture because of the natural characteristics of the park and the effect of logging
practices in the vicinity of the park. The studies made many suggestions to
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igation involved logging operations on private lands adjacent to
Redwood National Park in Northern California. The position of
the Sierra Club, the plaintiff, was that the National Park Service
should take various actions to protect the parklands from the
effects of the logging.
On one level, the Redwood National Park opinions stand for a
strong and vigorous public trust doctrine, imposing strict obliga-
tions on the United States. The Park Service, which was held to
be a trustee on behalf of the public,' s was ordered to use all of
its powers to protect the lands from adjacent logging, to attempt
to negotiate contracts with private loggers and to consider ac-
quiring private lands." The court even ordered the Park Service
to lobby Congress for funds to buy out some of the private land-
owners. 5 Further, the court took two steps that have been
alleviate further park damages. They included (1) the establishment of buffer
zones around the perimeter of the park; (2) the adoption of a landscape or
master plan for the park; (3) the purchase of additional lands or less than fee
management easements; and (4) the negotiation of cooperative agreements
with lumber companies, so that logging practices most detrimental to the park
could be mitigated by more sensitive road placement and maintenance, use of
cable logging rather than bulldozers, reduction in the size of clearcut parcels,
and replanting where regeneration was difficult. 398 F. Supp. at 286-91.
The court found that Interior's response, which consisted of three attempts
to negotiate cooperative agreements with timber companies, was inadequate.
The court held that the Secretary had failed to perform duties imposed by the
National Park System Act and the Redwood National Park Act and by the
trust obligations of the Secretary over the public lands. Id. at 293.
In the third Redwood National Park decision, the court ruled that the De-
partment of Interior had complied with its statutory and trust duties, and dis-
missed the action. 424 F. Supp. at 175. The court took note of the Department
of Interior's five progress reports, its submission to Congress of five alternative
proposals for park protection, its request for additional appropriations and au-
thority for park protection, and its attempts to obtain from major timber com-
panies voluntary compliance with guidelines aimed at reducing the impact of
logging operations on adjacent lands. Id. at 173-74.
In 1978 Congress added 48,000 acres to the Redwood National Park. Pub. L.
No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
See generally Hudson, Sierra Club v. Department of Interior: The Fight to
Preserve the Redwood National Park, 7 ECOL. L.Q. 781 (1979).
" See note 62 supra.
Id. The authority to purchase additional interests in lands on the periph-
ery of the park to protect the timber, soil and streams within the park from
logging operations on those adjacent lands was contained in the Redwood Na-
tional Park Act, 16 U.S.C. § 79c(e) (Supp. II 1979).
11 Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 294 (N.D. Cal.
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hallmarks of much of the complex civil litigation during this last
decade:6" the court kept continuing jurisdiction67 and ordered
the Park Service to report periodically back to the court."
But the holdings of the Redwood National Park cases can be
read in a more limited way regarding the public trust. The doc-
trine was invoked by relying on older cases decided during the
era when the doctrine was used to support federal power19 As
noted, those older cases used trust language, but their impact
was exactly the opposite of the propositions advanced by the
court in the Redwood National Park cases. The older cases uni-
1975). The court's order, that the National Park Service lobby Congress for
additional funding, finds some precedent in prison reform cases where resort to
the legislature for additional funding to implement the changes mandated by
the court was necessary. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Frug, The Judicial Power of the
Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1978); cf. Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218,
233 (1964) (district court had authority to compel county supervisors to levy
taxes to raise adequate funds to reopen public schools).
" See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1281 (1976), in which Professor Chayes argues that the traditional adjudi-
cative model, where private parties resolve private disputes, does not account
for much of the civil litigation in the federal courts. He says that federal litiga-
tion increasingly involves questions of public law, so that the adjudicative pro-
cess operates in a different fashion. The characteristics of public law litigation
include an amorphous party structure rather than a bilateral one; an inquiry
into legislative rather than adjudicative facts; relief that is not in the form of
compensation for prior wrongs or confined to the immediate parties, but rather
is forward looking and fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadly remedial lines;
a court decree that requires continued judicial participation in the administra-
tion of the remedy rather than termination of judicial involvement; and,
finally, a subject matter that concerns the operation of public policy, rather
than a dispute between private individuals about private rights. Id. at 1302.
The Redwood National Park litigation and many contemporary public lands
cases fit Chayes' description of the public law litigation model. Another exam-
ple is Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829
(D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913
(1976), in which the BLM programmatic environmental impact statement with
respect to its livestock-grazing permit program was held to violate NEPA. The
court retained jurisdiction to see that adequate, site-specific environmental im-
pact statements were prepared within a court-sanctioned time schedule. Id. at
842.
" Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 294 (N.D. Cal.
1975).
Id.
e See Section I(A)(2), "The Public Trust Doctrine as a Source of Federal
Power," supra.
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formly upheld federal agency action.7" The Redwood National
Park litigation constrained such action. Judge Sweigert also re-
lied on authority from Indian law 71 which, as noted, is not di-
rectly applicable to public land law.7 '
The Redwood National Park cases can be limited in other
ways as well. The court relied not just on the public trust doc-
trine but also on the National Park Service Organic Act7" and
the Redwood National Park Act,74 both of which contain strong
and specific provisions.7 5 In addition, the case dealt with an es-
pecially compelling factual situation. Redwood National Park is
not one contiguous park; it has many separate parcels. Many of
them are small, some including only one stand of redwoods or an
area along a particular stream. Some areas of the park are so
narrow that they may be "almost as tall as they are wide." 76 One
such area was involved in this case. The "Worm," a little finger
of the park extending southeast along Redwood Creek, was ex-
tremely vulnerable to logging on lands adjacent to the federal
lands.7 The creek was susceptible to changes in water quality
and water temperature. The trees in this delicate area were sub-
70 The court relied on two older cases to support its contention that the Sec-
retary of Interior held the public lands in trust. In Utah Power & Light Co. v.
United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917), the Court held that the United States was
not subject to state law concerning estoppel, laches and adverse possession.
Although there is language in the opinion that the United States holds the
lands in trust, id. at 409, the trust imposed carried with it no limitations on the
power of the federal government over the lands.
In Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891), the principal
case cited by Judge Sweigert as authority for the trust, the Supreme Court
stated that the Secretary of Interior was guardian of the public lands with obli-
gations to "see that the law is carried out and that none of the public domain
is wasted or is disposed of to a party not entitled to it." Id. at 181. Given the
federal policy of disposition of the public lands in effect at the time, see notes
100-108 infra, the trust conceived of in Knight imposed little restraint upon
the Department of Interior.
71 Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972), discussed in note 25
supra.
72 See notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra.
'1 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18f (1976).
71 16 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79j (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
71 See note 64 supra & note 96 infra.
76 See generally Wayburn & Wayburn, Last Chance for Redwood National
Park, 62 SIERRA CLUB BULL., Apr., 1977, at 10.
77 Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 290-91 (N.D. Cal.
1975).
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ject to substantial erosion and blowdown from the logging.78 For
all these reasons, along with the very presence of the extraordi-
nary coast redwood, 79 the Redwood National Park cases
presented an unusually strong case for judicial intervention.
Thus, while the importance of the Redwood National Park cases
should not be understated and while the public trust doctrine
was invoked in a vigorous form, these opinions are by no means
a definitive statement. Their use of the public trust doctrine can
78 In 1971 the National Park Service prepared a report stating:
Without application of special forest management practices to con-
trol present clearcutting methods, remaining old growth redwood
within the Park will be subject to wind throw. Steep slopes will
erode severely producing major slides in unstable soils known to
exist in the area. Water quality of the Park streams will deteriorate
as a result of the siltation.
It is essential therefore that a buffer zone comprising about
10,000 acres be established to protect the Redwood Creek area of
the Park.
Id. at 289.
79 There are two species of redwood. The Sierra redwood or giant sequoia
(Sequoia gigantia) is found in scattered locations in the Sierra Nevada at alti-
tudes between 4,000 and 8,000 feet. The coast redwood (Sequoia
sempervirens), at issue in the Redwood National Park litigation, is found in
dense, fog-shrouded groves from San Francisco north to southern Oregon in
areas near the coast. The coast redwood is highly desirable for lumber, and
approximately 90% of all virgin stands has been logged.
The coast redwood is the tallest living thing in the world. Some trees in the
Redwood National Park exceed 300 feet in height. Although not as old as the
Sierra redwoods, the coast redwoods are among the oldest living things; some
specimens alive today were young trees when Christ was born. While the coast
redwoods do not reach as great a diameter as their relatives in the Sierra Ne-
vada, their girth is nonetheless great enough to have inspired storied deeds:
The 19th-century millionaire William Waldorf Astor once made a
$25,000 wager with an English gentleman, General Williams, that
"he could seat 27 guests around a table made from a single cross
section of a great California redwood tree." Astor placed his order
.... and a tree was selected and cut on Lindsay Creek. It provided
a clear section over 15 feet in diameter and three feet thick. After
shipment around Cape Horn in 1897, the polished slab of redwood
provided a sumptuous base for a dinner party and decided the bet.
Unfortunately for Astor, the cost of acquiring his table was nearly
as great as the amount he won.
P. PALMQUIST, FINE CALIFORNIA ViEws: THE. PHOTOGRAPHS OF A. W. ERICSON 83
(1975).
See generally H.R. REP. No. 581, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. REP. No.
641, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); J. IsE, OUR NATIONAL PARK POLICY: A CRm-
CAL HISTORY 98-102 (1961).
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be restricted in too many ways.
The leading authority against the existence of a public trust
on the public lands is the federal district court opinion in Sierra
Club v. Andrus.80 The Sierra Club sought an order requiring the
Department of Interior to take action protecting alleged federal
reserved water rights in Southern Utah and Northern Arizona
from proposed energy projects, highly water-intensive uses.81 It
was a difficult case for the Sierra Club by any standard. No
water was being taken out of the streams by the energy projects
at the time the case was filed.62 In addition, the Department of
Interior was studying the question of reserved rights with con-
siderable diligence.83 These factors, the court said, when read
against the National Park Service Organic Act8 4 and the relevant
BLM legislation,86 raised no statutory duty for Interior to take
action at this time to protect its alleged reserved rights.8
The Sierra Club also contended that the public trust doctrine
required protective action by the Department of Interior. In de-
termining the existence of the public trust, the court analyzed
the 1978 amendments to the Redwood National Park Act,"1
which included an amendment to the National Park Service Or-
80 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No. 80-1674 (D.C. Cir. June
18, 1980).
The projects are described id. at 445-46.
0l Id. at 451.
83 An Interagency Task Force on Federal Non-Indian Reserved Water
Rights was created to organize and implement President Carter's water policy.
Leadership of the Task Force was delegated to the Solicitor of the Department
of Interior. The Task Force issued its final draft report on June 15, 1979, rec-
ommending that all federal land management agencies begin the process of
establishing priorities, principles and standards for quantification of their re-
spective water rights. The agencies, as the court noted, had begun that process.
Id. at 452.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18f (1976).
a' 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 & 1782(c) (1976).
The court found that there was a rational basis for the Department of
Interior to refrain from litigating the alleged federal water rights for three rea-
sons: (1) federal reserved water rights could not be lost or harmed by non-
assertion at this time; (2) none of the proposed energy projects had acquired
any vested water rights in the subject water courses; and (3) the relief sought
by the Sierra Club, the identification and quantification of alleged federal re-
served water rights, was currently being pursued through administrative
means. 487 F. Supp. 443, 450 (D.D.C. 1980).
6" Act of March 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163.
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ganic Act."' Holding that any trust duties must be found on the
face of a statute, 89 the court found that the amendment to the
Organic Act, plus language in a Senate committee report,9"
showed that Congress intended to eliminate any separate public
trust doctrine in the National Park system. The court also con-
cluded, without further analysis, that the BLM, like the Park
Service, had no trust duties independent of statute.9'
The amendment added the following language:
Congress further reaffirms, declares and directs that the promotion
and regulation of the various areas of the National Park System, as
defined in section 2 of this Act, shall be consistent with and found
in the purpose of the Act of August 25, 1916, to the common bene-
fit of all the people of the United States. The authorization of ac-
tivities shall be construed and the protection, management, and
administration of these areas shall be conducted in light of the
high public value and integrity of the National Park System and
shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for
which these areas have been or shall be directly and specifically
provided by Congress.
Id. § 101(b), 92 Stat. 163, 166, amending 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (Supp. III 1979).
89 Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed,
No. 80-1674 (D.C. Cir. June 18, 1980).
90 The court found that the 1978 amendment to the National Park Service
Organic Act eliminated any distinction between trust and statutory responsi-
bilities in the management of the National Park System. Judge Richey con-
cluded that the legislative history from the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources specifically addressed the trust issue, citing the following
language:
The committee has been concerned that litigation with regard to
Redwood National Park and other areas of the system may have
blurred the responsibilities articulated by the 1916 Act creating the
National Park service. ...
S. REP. No. 528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977).
[T]he committee strongly endorses the Administration's proposed
amendment to the Act of August 18, 1970, concerning the manage-
ment of the National Park System to refocus and insure the basis
for decisionmaking concerning the system continues to be the crite-
ria provided by 16 U.S.C. § 1 .... This restatement of these
highest principles of management is also intended to serve as the
basis for any judicial resolution of competing private and public
values and interest in . . .areas of the National Park System.
Id. at 7-8. The court disposed of the trust issue by holding that Congress in-
tended any judicial resolution of national park management issues to be based
upon the statutory standard contained in 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (1976). 487 F. Supp.
at 449.
9' Judge Richey found that 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 & 1782(c) (1976) contained the
"entire duty and responsibility to manage and protect Bureau of Land Man-
1980]
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Judge Richey's conclusions are difficult to support. The lan-
guage of the 1978 amendments is simply not clear; if anything, it
seems implicitly to impose trust obligations on the National
Park Serivce by referring to "the high public value and integrity
of the National Park System."' 2 Similarly, the committee re-
ports are brief and ambiguous and do not support any limitation
on the public trust doctrine."s Further, the issues involving the
agement lands. . . ." 487 F. Supp. at 449.
12 See note 88 supra.
13 The 1978 amendment to the National Park Service Organic Act was given
little consideration in the legislative history. The amendment was contained in
legislation that added 48,000 acres to the Redwood National Park. The legisla-
tion also contained a number of measures to mitigate any adverse economic
impact that might be caused to the local economy. As a result, the primary
concern of the legislative history was the necessity of acquiring additional acre-
age to protect the park, the impact of the acquisition on employment in the
region, the programs to be implemented to assist those who lost their jobs due
to the park's expansion and the issue of just compensation for the lands pur-
chased. The amendment was discussed in one paragraph in the House report:
Subsection (b) of section 101 amends the General Authorities Act
of 1970 by adding a declaration by Congress that the promotion
and regulation of the National Park System is to be consistent with
the Organic Act for the National Park Service. The protection of
the units of the system is to be carried out in accordance with the
maintenance of the integrity of this system, and management of
these areas shall not compromise these resource values except as
Congress may have specifically provided. Thus, the Secretary is to
afford the highest standard of protection and care to the lands
within Redwood National Park.
H.R. REP. No. 581, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1977) (emphasis added).
The Senate Report does little to clear the water. The language relied on by
the court is set out in note 90 supra. But that is not all the Senate Report said.
The Report states that the primary purpose of the amendment is to
refocus and insure that the basis for decisionmaking concerning the
National Park System continues to be the criteria provided by 16
U.S.C. § 1-that is, to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for the en-
joyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will
leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.
S. REP. No. 528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1977). Later the brief analysis of
the amendment is concluded with the following language: "The Secretary is to
afford the highest standard of protection and care to the national resources
within Redwood National Park and the National Park System. No decision
shall compromise these resource values except as Congress may have specifi-
cally provided." Id. at 14.
Thus it is difficult to find language in either of these reports to support
Judge Richey's conclusion that the 1978 amendment eliminated trust notions
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public trust doctrine and the 1978 amendments were hardly
briefed at all by the Government or the Mountain States Legal
Foundation, which intervened on the side of the United States."
Like the Redwood National Park opinions, Sierra Club v. An-
drus does not provide a definitive resolution of these public
trust issues.
B. Statutory Precedent
One threshold issue is whether or not the public trust can ex-
ist in public land law independent of statute.9 5 To be sure, none
of the major public land management statutes uses the word
"trust." Nevertheless, the National Park Service Organic Act of
191696 and the Wilderness Act of 196497 expressly create high
in National Park System management. Although the Senate committee ex-
pressed general "concern" over the role of the public trust in the Redwood
National Park litigation, both reports use language that seems to impose
strong trust responsibilities upon the Secretary of Interior. No proponent of
the public trust would be unhappy to learn that the National Park Service
Organic Act had been amended with legislative history from both houses of
Congress requiring the Secretary of Interior to afford the "highest standard of
protection and care" to lands within the National Park System.
" The brief filed by Intervenor Mountain States Legal Foundation in sup-
port of defendant's motion for summary judgment attempted no analysis of
the trust issue. The public trust cases cited by the Sierra Club were never dis-
cussed. The legislative history of 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (1976) was not mentioned. In
addition, the analysis of 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (1976) and 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976)
was conclusory. The brief concludes by arguing that the statutes do not man-
date any duty at all on the Secretary of Interior to define, assert or protect
federal reserved water rights. How the public trust may have influenced or re-
ceived content by these statutes was ignored. Memorandum in Support of Mo-
tion fdr Summary Judgment, at 7-8 (filed July 16, 1979).
Similarly, the Department of Justice brief did not address the public trust
issue. The Government argued that no mandatory duty to protect federal re-
served water rights existed in the statutes governing the administration of the
parks or in the National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18f (1976).
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Dismiss, at 26-27 (filed July 16, 1979).
95 Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed,
No. 80-1674 (D.C. Cir. June 18, 1980).
"E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides that national park lands are to be man-
aged "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the
wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations."
" E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1976):
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duties that set standards not dissimilar to those imposed on pri-
vate trustees. On the other hand, the two largest agencies, the
Forest Service and the BLM, operate under modern laws that
set rigid standards in several respects but that still are best
characterized as multiple-use, sustained-yield enactments.9 A
review of the evolution of statutory law in the field of public
land law is instructive in determining the extent to which
public lands legislation imposes, or is compatible with, trust
responsibilities."
In the 19th century, the inland public lands and resources
were used as inducements to subsidize the opening of the West.
Ranchers were allowed to graze their stock on the open public
domain at no cost and without federal regulation.100 Free land
In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by
expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy
and modify all areas within the United States and its possessions,
leaving no lands designated for preservation and protection in their
natural condition, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Con-
gress to secure for the American people of present and future gen-
erations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness. For this
purpose there is hereby established a National Wilderness Preser-
vation System to be composed of federally owned areas designated
by Congress as "wilderness areas," and these shall be administered
for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner
as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wil-
derness, and so as to provide for the protection of these areas, the
preservation of their wilderness character, and for the gathering
and dissemination of information regarding their use and enjoy-
ment as wilderness; and no Federal lands shall be designated as
"wilderness areas" except as provided for in this chapter or by a
subsequent Act.
98 National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat.
2949 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1976) and scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976) and scattered
sections of 7, 16, 30 & 40 U.S.C.)
Leading sources on the history of public land law are P. GATEs, supra
note 33, B. HIBBARD, supra note 34, and S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX, supra note 44.
The last-cited work is a revision of S. DANA, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY (1956),
which remains useful because not all of the early history contained in the first
edition is included in the revised edition.
100 In Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918), a state law denying
sheepherders access to public grazing land previously grazed by cattle was
found to be valid because no federal laws were applicable. It was not until 1934
that the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (codi-
fied at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1976)), provided for federal regulation of grazing
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was made available to settlers through various preemption and
homesteading laws.101 Timberlands were available for home-
steading' 2 and through railroad land grants. 03 Public miner-
als,104 water'0 5 and wildlife'" were readily available to the first
takers. The United States did not manage its timberlands, even
on the public domain. In national forests the Forest Service began charging
minimal grazing fees in 1906, but no fees were charged on public domain graz-
ing lands until after the Taylor Grazing Act was enacted in 1934. U.S. SECRE-
TARY OF INTERIOR & U.S. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, STUDY OF FEES FOR GRAZ-
ING LIvESTOCK ON FEDERAL LAND, 2-1 to 2-3 (1977).
101 E.g., Homestead Act of 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1097 (codified at 30 U.S.C.
9 35 (1976) and scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.); Enlarged Homestead Act of
1909, ch. 160, 35 Stat. 639 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 218) (repealed 1976). See
generally P. GATES, supra note 33, at 219-47, 387-434.
102 E.g., Mineral Land Free Timber Act, ch. 150, 20 Stat. 88 (1878) (codified
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 604-606 (1976)). See generally P. GATES, supra note 33, at 485-
86.
1o See generally S. DANA & S. FAIRFAx, supra note 44, at 19-20.
104 General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §
22-49 (1976) and scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.). In addition to minerals, har-
drock miners were entitled to obtain in fee 20 acres of land overlying the de-
posit. See generally G. COGGINS & C. WLKINSON, supra note 27, at 334-467. A
leasing system of fuel minerals was not established until 1920 when the Min-
eral Leasing Act of 1920 was passed, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (codified at 30 U.S.C.
99 181-187 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
105 In an early case, the California Supreme Court upheld appropriations of
water pursuant to state law and local custom. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140
(1855). Thus the law of prior appropriations originally developed through the
acts of persons who were technically trespassers on the public domain. Basey v.
Gallagher, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 670 (1874). Congress later validated water rights
based on local law and customs. See Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262 § 2, 14 Stat.
253; Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 218. As a result, water rights
have traditionally been established on the public lands according to state law
with little federal intervention. See California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver
Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935). See also I W. HUTCHINS, WATER
RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 254-58 (1972).
106 "Before 1969, federal wildlife law existed only in unrelated bits and
pieces. Most matters pertaining to wildlife regulation were generally thought to
be the exclusive prerogative of the state." Coggins, Federal Wildlife Law
Achieves Adolescence: Developments in the 1970s, 1978 DUKE L. J. 753, 760.
See also Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 703 (1976). An
exception existed in the national parks where hunting has been traditionally
prohibited. See, e.g., Act of May 7, 1894, ch. 72, 28 Stat. 73 (1894). The older
notion that wildlife was the property of the state and not subject to federal
legislation was brought to an end with Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529
(1976), and Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (overruling Geer v. Con-
necticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)).
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in the loosest sense, until 1905,17 and the General Land Office
existed almost exclusively to divest the United States of land
and resources-not to manage them.108 Trust notions were anti-
thetical to the public lands policies that prevailed during these
early days.
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Congress halt-
ingly began to reserve land and to take a new approach. Some
land was set aside from development to be held for future gener-
ations.109 The range 10 and timber"' resources were more ac-
tively managed on a sustained-yield basis. Fuel minerals were
removed from the "self-initiation" concept of the General Min-
ing Law of 1872112 and in 1920 were placed under a leasing sys-
tem allowing for an ordered federal disposition of such miner-
als."1 Although these statutes were rudimentary compared with
modern legislation, they established general responsibilities that
guided public lands agencies until well after World War II.
Since the early 1960's, and especially during the 1970's, the
pressure on all resources has increased so much that Congress
has resorted to a wholly different management approach. The
National Environmental Policy Act," passed in 1970, applies on
all the public lands. Several pieces of wilderness legislation have
established a burgeoning preservation system beyond anyone's
107 See S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX, supra note 44, at 79-83 (creation of Forest
Service).
108 See P. GATES, supra note 33, at 127-28. See generally P. Foss, POLITICS
AND GRASS (1960); M. CLAWSON, THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT (1971). In
1946 the General Land Office and the Grazing Service were merged to form the
Bureau of Land Management.
109 E.g., Yellowstone National Park Establishment Act of 1872, 16 U.S.C.
§ 21 (1976); National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18f
(1976).
110 Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1976). See E. PEFFEE, THE
CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 214-24 (1941). See also notes 100 & 108 supra.
" Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473, 482 (1976). The
Forest Service was engaged in active management and land-use planning long
before the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976), was
passed in 1960. Wilson, Land Management Planning Processes of the Forest
Service, 8 ENv. L. 461 (1978). That Act in effect ratified prior Forest Service
practice. Id.
I" See note 104 supra.
113 See Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979).
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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vision when the original Wilderness Act was passed in 1964.115
The Forest Service has been the subject of two major acts, the
Resources Planning Act of 1974116 and the National Forest Man-
agement Act of 1976.117 The BLM received an Organic Act in
1976.118 Legislation concerning endangered species 9 coal leas-
ing"' and other public lands issues"' has also been enacted dur-
ing this period.
In regard to land ownership, Congress has turned four-square
from a policy of disposition to a policy of retention. 22 Indeed,
the policy of disposition has not only been halted but reversed.
Recent federal acquisitions of land and interests in land have
"6 See The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976). Later
acts include The Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-622, 88 Stat.
2096 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 nt (Supp. III 1979); The Boundary Water
Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95:495, 92 Stat. 1649 (codified
at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1132nt-1133 (1981); The Endangered American Wilderness
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-237, 92 Stat. 40 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1132
(1981)). As to the expansion of the wilderness system, see generally G. COG-
GINS & C. WLKINSON, supra note 27, at 791-839. In 1980 Congress multiplied
the wilderness system more than three-fold by designating nearly 57 million
acres of public lands in Alaska as wilderness. See Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified in
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
116 The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1610 (1976), as amended by the National Forest Manage-
ment Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949.
'" Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614
(1976) and scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
118 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1782 (1976) and scattered sections of 7, 16, 30 & 40 U.S.C.
"' The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976).
120 Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, 30 U.S.C. §§ 191, 201,
202, 204, 207, 208 (1976). See also Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. I 1977).
" See, e.g., The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1340 (1976).
122 In the Declaration of Policy in FLPMA, Congress made express its policy
of retaining public land in federal ownership:
The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States
that the public lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless as a
result of the land use planning procedure provided for in this Act,
it is determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve the
national interest . ...
43 U.S.C. § 1701 (a)(1) (1976). FLPMA allows a congressional veto of the dis-
posal of parcels of public land in excess of 2,500 acres. Id. § 1713.
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been most impressive in scope.12
Today, then, there is a new generation of public lands stat-
utes. This statutory matrix uses entirely new mechanisms: land
use planning, 124 long-range planning,1 25 citizen involvement,1 2 6
interdisciplinary planning 27 and citizen access to information.1' 8
Further, the modern statutes set on-the-ground standards for
management' 2 9 -a new concept. As discussed in the next sec-
tion, these extraordinary developments are fully compatible with
the public trust doctrine.
C. Summary
The statutory developments just recounted help explain why
some thirty-six court opinions over the years have described the
inland public lands as being held in trust and why the judicial
formulations have varied in different eras. During the three eras
of judicial decisions described above, the courts have quite pre-
cisely tracked and reflected congressional action. In the 19th
century, the congressional conception was that public lands
should be sold and placed under state jurisdiction.130 The con-
12 As of September 30, 1977, the Forest Service had over 187 million acres,
of which 27,325,464 acres were acquired land. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra
note 1, at 14. The BLM administers some 450 million acres, including
2,363,623 acres of acquired lands. Id. at 20. The Fish and Wildlife Service
manages approximately 31 million acres, having acquired 4,184,434 acres. Id. at
19. The National Park Service manages 26,281,496 acres, of which 5,869,718
acres were acquired. Id. See generally Sax, Buying Scenery: Land Acquisitions
for the National Park Service, 1980 DuKE L.J. 709. The Public Land Law Re-
view Commission expressed concern that acquisition programs might erode the
state and local tax base, PLLRC REP., supra note 4, at 267. This problem is
addressed in FLPMA, where it is declared to be a congressional policy to com-
pensate state and local governments for burdens created as a result of the im-
munity of federal lands from state and local taxation. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(13)
(1976). For criticism of the acquisition policy, see COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE FEDERAL DRIVE To ACQUIRE PRIVATE LANDS
SHOULD BE REASSESSED, CED-80-14 (Dec. 14, 1979).
124 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (1976); 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1976).
124 E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
124 See, e.g, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d); 43 U.S.C. § 1712(f) (1976).
127 E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h) (1976); 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(2) (1976).
128 See The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976); National
Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
129 E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) (1976); 30 U.S.C. §§ 1239, 1258, 1262, 1265,
1266, 1267, 1272 & 1281 (1976).
1o See notes 33-36 and 100-108 and accompanying text supra.
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temporary judicial opinions reflected that policy. 31 Later, when
Congress began tentatively to protect and manage the federal
lands,133 the courts upheld Congress' newly asserted power.133
The modern statutes are premised on the high station that to-
day's society accords to the economic and environmental values
of the federal lands and resources."3 4 They are rigorous laws
designed to protect the public's interest in the public's re-
sources. The legislation requires that public lands and resources
not be sold, except in limited and exceptional circumstances;
that the public resources are to be nurtured and preserved; that
the public is to play a measured but significant role in decision-
making; and that the lands and resources are to be managed on
a sustained-yield basis for future generations.
The whole of these laws is greater than the sum of its parts.
The modern statutes set a tone, a context, a milieu. When read
together they require a trustee's care. Thus we can expect courts
today, like courts in earlier eras, to characterize Congress' mod-
ern legislative scheme as imposing a public trust on the public
resources.
The fact that the public trust doctrine in public land law must
rest on implication should surprise no one. The doctrine has al-
ways rested on implication. No legislation imposed it at common
law, though the Magna Carta made reference to eliminating ob-
structions in coastal rivers.135 The doctrine was applied to the
original states, and later to the western states through the equal
footing doctrine, by implication."' Thus Illinois Central137 itself
rested on an implied trust. While it might be argued that the
comprehensive statutory scheme in modern public land law
leaves no room for implied doctrines,'" that conclusion is belied
1 See Section I(A)(1), "The Public Trust Doctrine as an Obligation to the
States," supra.
133 See notes 109-113 and accompanying text supra.
,OS See Section I(A)(2), "The Public Trust Doctrine as a Source of Federal
Power," supra.
'" See notes 2-11 and accompanying text supra.
135 See H. ALTHAUS, supra note 18, at 23.
'6 E.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); see notes 37-43 and
accompanying text supra.
137 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see notes 14-16 and
accompanying text supra.
13 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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both by implied doctrines that already exist in public land law 8'
and by state cases that have based results on the implied public
trust doctrine in spite of statutes covering the same subject
matter. 40
Further, there is a strong tradition of applying trust notions in
public land law. In a few instances trusts have been imposed by
express legislative action, but most often the trust obligations
have been implied. Trusts in public land law have involved
school lands,1 41 swamp lands1 42 and miners hospitals, 143 among
other things.14 4
Finally, although little land under navigable waterways is now
in federal ownership,1 " the classic public trust doctrine seems to
139 See note 194 and accompanying text infra. Modern courts might properly
look to federal common law as the source of the public trust doctrine. See Hill,
The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967), in which Professor Hill argues that there are areas
where federal courts create sustantive law without the guidance of statutory or
constitutional standards and that federal courts have the same range of judi-
cial powers that state courts possess. See also Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And
of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964). For a brief
but comprehensive review of the issue, see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 60 (1976). Professor Wright concludes that section by stating: "It
may be, as Justice Brandeis said, that there is no federal general common law,
but there remains a substantial area for the application of federal common
law." Id. at 286.
140 See, e.g., United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conser-
vation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976); Gould v. Greylock Reservation
Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
41 See, e.g., Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U.S. 168 (1914); Cooper v. Roberts, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 173 (1855). For a discussion of the federal purpose behind these
school grants, see State of Utah v. Kleppe, 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds, 100 S. Ct. 1803 (1980).
"'2 Mills Co. v. Burlington & Mo. River R.R., 107 U.S. 557 (1882), negated a
trust as to these lands. Later cases, however, indicate that a trust exists, but
that it can be enforced only by the United States--not by private parties or
the states. Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1900); United States v.
Des Moines Navigation & R.R., 142 U.S. 510, 541-42 (1891).
43 E.g., United States v. New Mexico, 536 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1976), in
which the court reviewed two land grants for miners' hospitals. Although only
one of these grants contained trust language, the court found that a trust ex-
isted as to both.
144 Other examples are trusts for park lands, Hutchings v. Low, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 77 (1872); local improvements, United States v. Des Moines Navigation
& R.R., 142 U.S. 510 (1892); and, in some instances, railroads, Stearns v. Min-
nesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900).
14 Although lands beneath navigable water courses passed to the states at
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have applied to navigable waterways before they passed out of
federal hands. That is, before new states took lands under navi-
gable watercourses at statehood, the United States was bound
by the limitations imposed by the public trust doctrine in much
the same way that states have been limited by the trust since
statehood."O Just as Illinois was limited in the disposition of the
statehood, see notes 17 & 38-41 and accompanying text supra, the United
States has since acquired some such lands, including, for example, coastal ar-
eas in the Point Reyes National Seashore in California, the Gateway National
Recreation Area in New York and the Golden Gate National Recreation Area
in San Francisco. See Futrell, Parks to the People: New Directions for the
National Park System, 25 EMORY L.J. 255 (1976).
146 After the colonies broke away from England, navigable waterways in the
United States were generally subject to the same restrictions that had existed
at common law:
[W]e hold, therefore, that the same doctrine as to the dominion
and sovereignty over and ownership of lands under the navigable
waters of the Great Lakes applies, which obtains at the common
law. . ., and that the lands are held by the same right in the one
case as in the other, and subject to the same trusts and limitations.
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37 (1892). In the original 13
states, such lands never became federal property but rather remained in state
ownership when the Union was formed. Thus the. original states-not the
United States-were charged with the trust obligations. See, e.g., Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). When the United States later ac-
quired western lands by cession from the states or by treaties with foreign na-
tions, navigable waterways were viewed as being held by the United States for
future states, which would receive those lands at statehood so as to put them
on an equal footing with the original states. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212, 223-24 (1845); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434-35 (1892).
No case has struck down a federal transfer of lands under navigable water-
ways before statehood, so that there is no holding that the classic public trust
doctrine applied to the United States. The Court's opinion in Martin v. Wad-
dell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 409-14 (1842), suggests that the United States had
the same trust obligations as the Crown and the states, but the clearest exposi-
tion that the United States was limited by the classic public trust doctrine in
dealing with navigable watercourses before statehood is in Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1 (1894). The issue in that case was whether a federal homestead
patent, issued before Oregon statehood, transferred lands below the high-water
mark on a navigable river. The Court, recognizing that Congress was bound to
hold such lands for future states, id. at 48-49, construed the homestead patent
strictly so as to exclude lands below the high-water mark. Id. at 50. After
describing the trust obligations of the Crown and the original states, the Court
said that, as to public lands not within any state, "the same title and dominion
passed to the United States." Id. at 57. Such a result was logically necessary
since the United States was "the only government which [could] impose laws
upon" public lands before statehood. Id. at 48. In recognizing a limited right to
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Chicago Harbor by the reasoning in Illinois Central, so too was
Congress limited before statehood in its ability to transfer navi-
gable watercourses located in federal territory. This means that
the classic public trust doctrine had a dramatic potential impact
on public land law until 1959, since navigable watercourses in
Alaska were subject to the public trust when the United States
held such lands in territorial status before Alaska statehood. 147
Trust concepts are thus no stranger to public land law.
The shifting notions of trust responsibility reflect fundamen-
tal changes in legal perceptions of the government's role in pub-
lic land law. As recently as the 1950's, the courts conceptualized
the United States as a proprietor in regard to the public lands.
The public lands were viewed as capital assets over which fed-
eral control could be asserted, much as if Congress and the land
management agencies were private parties managing private
affairs.14 This conceptualization of the government as a proprie-
convey trust resources, the Court indicated that territorial lands under naviga-
ble waterways were held in trust and that such lands could be alienated only
under exigent circumstances:
The Congress of the United States, in disposing of the public
lands, has constantly acted upon the theory that those lands,
whether in the interior or on the coast, above high-water mark,
may be taken up by actual occupants, in order to encourage the
settlement of the country, but that the navigable waters and the
soils under them, whether within or above the ebb and flow of the
tide, shall be and remain public highways; and, being chiefly valu-
able for the public purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishery,
and for the improvements necessary to secure and promote those
purposes, shall not be granted away during the period of territorial
government, but, unless in case of some international duty or pub-
lic exigency, shall be held by the United States in trust for the
future states, and shall vest in the several states, when organized
and admitted into the Union, with all the powers and prerogatives
appertaining to the older states in regard to such waters and soils
within their respective jurisdictions; in short, shall not be disposed
of piecemeal to individuals, as private property, but shall be held
as a whole for the purpose of being ultimately administered and
dealt with for the public benefit by the state, after it shall have
become a completely organized community.
Id. at 49-50. See also id. at 58.
147 See Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339. See also
United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1970).
148 The apex of this notion may have been reached in Camfield v. United
States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), in which the Court stated that Congress "may deal
with such lands precisely as a private individual may deal with his farming
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tor was the source of a range of doctrines with broad conse-
quences. For example, public participation in rulemaking was
not considered appropriate because public land management
was an internal affair."" Standing.was narrowly construed to re-
strict public access to the courts.'"" Sovereign immunity barred a
considerable amount of litigation.'5 The doctrine of "committed
to agency discretion by law" was invoked to deny judicial re-
view.1" When judicial review was available, it was sharply cir-
cumscribed by numerous decisions giving broad sway to agency
discretion. 153
These developments, of course, have been almost completely
reversed by recent statutes and judicial decisions.'" It is now
I
property." Id. at 524. See also, e.g., Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954);
United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526 (1840). See generally Montgomery, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law: Its Application in the Judicial
Review of Land Classification Decisions, 8 WILLAMETrE L. J. 135, 146-51
(1972).
19 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1976) provides that one of the exemptions to
rulemaking is "a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to
public property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts." "Public property" was
defined by the Attorney General to embrace
rules issued by any agency with respect to real or personal property
owned by the United States or by any agency of the United States.
Thus, the making of rules relating to the public domain, i.e., the
sale or lease of public lands or of mineral, timber or grazing rights
in such lands, is exempt from the requirement of section 4.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ArORNEY GENzRAL's MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE AcT 27 (1947). For a discussion of the application of this exemp-
tion, see Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to
Public Property Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540,
557-61 (1970).
150 See, e.g, Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1937). For a
discussion of the standing issue in public lands litigation before the modern
era, see Comment, The Conservationists and the Public Lands: Administra-
tive and Judicial Remedies Relating to the Use and Disposition of the Public
Lands Administered by the Department of the Interior, 68 MICH. L. REV.
1200, 1200-22 (1970).
'" See, e.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1962). See also Scalia, Sovereign
Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some
Conclusions from the Public Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867 (1970).
I'l 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976); see, e.g., Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706 (9th
Cir. 1964). See generally Comment, supra note 150, at 1237-38.
'88 See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) (broad authority to issue oil
and gas leases); Dorothy Thomas Foundation, Inc. v. Hardin, 317 F. Supp.
1072 (W.D.N.C. 1970) (broad authority to provide for timber sales).
'" See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 27, at 226-34.
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established that the United States acts as a sovereign govern-
ment-not just as a proprietor-in regard to the public lands.'"
This has had two major ramifications. First, Congress has the
power, under the Supremacy Clause,' 4 to preempt state law on
the federal lands. 5 7 Second, and of greater moment for our pur-
poses, the shift to a conceptualization of the federal role as gov-
ernmental rather than proprietary focuses attention on duties to
the public. Rulemaking is required, records are open, decision-
making is shared, and the courts are available because public
lands business is public business. It is the public to whom public
lands managers are ultimately accountable.
These various trends merge in the longstanding tendency of
the courts to describe the public lands as being held in trust. It
is the product of a search of two centuries to articulate the gov-
ernment's duties and responsibilities. The trust concept has
been properly invoked as the best available formulation of the
central doctrinal forces in public land law-that increasingly
tough strictures are required, and have been imposed, on land
management officials; that land management is not a private
business; that ultimate accountability is to the public; and that
over time the public and Congress have come to place ever
greater importance on the nation's public natural resources.
The trust notion, as a generic concept, is an appropriate
description of the federal role in public land law. It is a com-
mon-sense description that has evolved in regard to the inland
public lands just as it has developed in closely related subject
areas. The more difficult issue, as discussed in the next section,
is determining the scope and content of the trust.
II. SCOPE AM CONTEN OF THE TRUST
The policies behind the classic public trust doctrine have been
manifested in several different specific rules. The doctrine has
operated as a limit on disposition of resources, as a requirement
that agency authority to change trust uses be narrowly con-
strued, as a basis for a requirement for comprehensive planning
and in other ways.158 An essential characteristic of the doctrine
1 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
157Kieppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
'" See Johnson, Lake Surface Users v. Water Extractors, A Public Trust
Issue? this issue at 233.
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is the flexibility with which it applies to different resources and
resource uses.
159
Several possible variations of the public trust doctrine are un-
likely to be utilized in public land law. The branch of the doc-
trine placing limitations on dispositions of trust resources is
almost certainly inapplicable to the inland public lands.'" The
disposition of public lands is longstanding policy'' and has been
affirmed in numerous cases.'' 6 Further, the sale and trade of in-
land public lands are already governed by statutes placing strict
limits on such dispositions.'" Similarly, the branch of the doc-
trine requiring comprehensive planning when trust resources are
developed has little practical application to public land law. The
rule in United Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State
Water Conservation Commission'" has far-reaching potential in
water resources development, where most western states have
only rudimentary planning procedures. But such a rule, so legiti-
mately important in its own context, is an irrelevancy in public
land law. The skeletal planning required by the North Dakota
Supreme Court '65 is far outstripped by federal lands statutes
such as NEPA, FLPMA and the NFMA.' 66
Finally, it is unlikely that courts would find that Congress has
trust obligations to transfer public lands from federal ownership.
The legal arguments of those supporting the Sagebrush Rebel-
lion would lead to such a result. 187 Although dictum in Pollard v.
1'9 See Sax, supra note 15, at 556-57.
I" For a suggestion that extraordinary dispositions by Congress might be
prohibited, see note 183 infra.
'* See notes 101-108 supra.
16 See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), discussed in note 146
supra.
13 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1713 (1976).
'' 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
168 The court said only that "some short and long-term planning" was re-
quired before a permit could issue for appropriations of water for development
of substantial coal-related power and energy production facilities. Id. at 462.
' See notes 114 & 124-127 supra.
167 On the legal basis of the Sagebrush Rebellion, compare Leshy, Unrav-
eling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal Lands, this issue at
317, with Note, The Property Power, Federalism and the Equal Footing Doc-
trine, 80 COLUM. L. Rav. 817 (1980); Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who
Should Control the Public Lands? 1980 UTAH L. Rav. 505. The Solicitor's
Office has not published a formal legal opinion on the Sagebrush Rebellion,
but the efficacy of the arguments of Nevada and other states was discounted in
a recent memorandum. See AssocKTz SoLIcrroR, ENERGY AND R.souacEs, Nz-
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Hagan1 does support such a trust obligation, Pollard has not
been followed on that issue. 1" Any broad trust obligation to dis-
pose of federal lands would necessarily be bottomed on an over-
ruling of Kleppe v. New Mexico,1 70 a unanimous 1976 Supreme
Court case recognizing broad federal sovereign powers over the
public lands under the Property Clause.1 71 But Kleppe is consis-
tent with earlier cases,17'2 is similar to developments under the
Commerce Clause 1 7 and has since been cited with approval by
the Court.17 ' Thus, while the Sagebrush Rebellion may have im-
portant political repercussions, its legal premises are unlikely to
be accepted by modern courts.
Some branches of the public trust doctrine, therefore, do not
bear on the public lands. The following sections, however, dis-
cuss other applications of the doctrine that more properly apply
in public land law.
VADA'S CLAIM TO OWNRSHIP OF THE PuBLIc LANDS (Dec. 6, 1979).
168 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). See notes 37-43 and accompanying text
supra.
169 A few early cases followed the dictum in Pollard, see note 41 supra, but
the language concerning the inland public lands has not been approved in well
over a century. The holding in Pollard-that states acquire lands under navi-
gable watercourses in trust at statehood under the equal footing doctrine -re-
mains good law. See, e.g., Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
170 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
1'71 Id. at 539.
171 E.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897) (congressional
authority "may . .. involve the exercise of what is ordinarily known as 'the
police power'. . ."); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911), discussed in
notes 47-52 supra. But see Engdahl, supra note 42, at 349-58.
173 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For example, the Commerce Clause can be
employed to reach activities outside of interstate commerce if the intrastate
commerce competes with goods in interstate commerce. Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942). Similarly, the Property Clause may be invoked to
regulate activities off public lands if there is a direct impact on activities on
public lands. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897); United States v.
Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th
Cir. 1977). On the evolution of the Commerce Clause as a basis for preemption
of state law, see L. TRINz, AmzmcAN ONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 376-89 (1978). For
examples of the generally parallel development of the Property Clause, see the
authorities cited in note 172 supra and Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529
(1976).
174 Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 393 (1978).
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A. A Constraint on Congressional Actijon
One possible use of the public trust doctrine is as a limit on
the powers of Congress, just as the classic doctrine has been
found to restrict state legislatures. If the doctriiae is to be so
used, the source °of the limitation must be found in the
Constitution.
There is ample reason to believe that the Property Clause
does not include an implied trust, since there is nothing in the
constitutional debates to indicate such a trust."7 Rather than
finding a constitutional footing for the trust, the Supreme Court
might be more likely to tie the trust to a comprehensive statu-
tory scheme. 17  Thus the Court might conclude that Congress
had established a trust duty on itself and on the agencies, but
only as a matter of statutory policy. Yet just two years ago, the
Ninth Circuit-citing the Property Clause-.referred to "the
Constitutional precept that public lands are held in trust by the
federal government for all the people.
1 77
1' See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 466 (rev. ed. 1937); A. PREs-
COTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTrTION 478 (1941). .n some states the pub-
lic trust doctrine is constitutionally based and cannot. be overridden by the
legislature. See, e.g., Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928); Peo-
ple ex rel. Director of Conservation v. Babcock, 38 Mich. App. 336, 196 N.W.2d
489 (1972). For a comprehensive review of environmental provisions in state
constitutions that could provide support for the public trust doctrine, see Frye,
Environmental Provisions in State Constitutions, 5 ENviR. L. REP. 50028
(1975). See also W. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 182-84.
16 The Court has traditionally avoided constitutional interpretations if a
statutory basis for decision is available. E.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court,
331 U.S. 549, 568-75 (1947). In public land law, one noteworthy opinion in
which the Court avoided constitutional issues is United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915), where the Court based presidential withdrawal au-
thority upon the implied acquiescence of Congress rather than upon inherent
executive authority.
177 United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1978). The
court held for the Government in a title dispute, declining to find estoppel
against the Government. The court used the existence of the trust as a basis
for explaining that the equities in estoppel cases run not only to the parties at
bar but also to the general public, which is the ultimate beneficiary of the
trust. Thus the trust was used to justify federal prerogatives--not to place lim-
its on Congress. The only authority cited in Ruby to support the conclusion
that Congress is a constitutional trustee was United States v. California, 332
U.S. 19 (1947), which stands only for broad federal power. Hence the language
in Ruby does not by itself suggest that a constitutionally based trust, if it ex-
ists, acts as a limit on congressional power.
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We know -that courts have said with some regularity that pub-
lic lands are held in trust for the people.'78 Although no congres-
sional action was involved, the Supreme Court was willing, at
least in Illinois Central,1 79 to overturn state legislative action.
The Property Clause is dynamic and expanding in scope;
Kleppe s0 tells us that. In addition, our society has come to
place a new primacy on the remaining public lands, including
both their economic and non-economic resources.181 The Consti-
tution is an evolving document that must respond to changing
conditions in our society.182 It is entirely possible, therefore, that
178 See note 32 .supra.
178 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see text accompanying
notes 14-18 supra.
180 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). Although Kleppe can be
viewed as being based on existing precedent, see note 172 supra, the case was
plainly the first Sulpreme Court opinion to uphold the sweeping exercises of
federal power found in modern public lands legislation.
181 See text accornpanying notes 2-11 supra.
182 This interpretsttion of the Constitution has existed since Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819),
in which he stated, "[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding," id. at 4t07 (emphasis in original), "a constitution intended to en-
dure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adopted to the various crises of
human affairs," id. at 415. Justice Frankfurter described Marshall's analysis as
"the single most important utterance in the literature of constitutional law -
most important because most comprehensive and comprehending." Frank-
furter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARv. L. REv. 217, 218
(1955). See also L. LEIrY, JUDGMmm'rs: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HisTORY 17-18 (1972); Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It
Always Meant? 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1029, 1058-59 (1977). For subsequent deci-
sions articulating this view, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 669 (1966); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941); Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934); Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
433-34 (1920).
Karl Llewellyn suggested that the great common law judges did not look
principally at the past for guidance, but rather looked at the times in which
they lived - at the social values and needs which had current existence- sav-
ing from the past only broad principles and basic values. K. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADIoN-DICMING APPEALS (1960). Jerome Frank espoused a
similar philosophy:
New instruments of production, new modes of travel and of dwell-
ing, new credit and ownership devices, new concentrations of capi-
tal, new social customs, habits, aims and ideals - all these factors
of innovation make vain hope that definitive legal rules can be
drafted that will forever after solve all legal problems. When
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courts today would find that the Property Clause includes some
general trust notions and that Congress is a constitutional trus-
tee. That is perhaps the most logical way to explain the language
in the court opinions.
But a constitutionally based trust doctrine is probably not en-
forceable against Congress for several reasons.' s" The tradition
of transferring public lands is too deeply ingrained.18 4 Congres-
sional power under the Property Clause is very broad.185 The
statutory decisions that Congress makes are too complex, techni-
human relationships are transforming daily, legal relationships can-
not be expressed in enduring form. The constant development of
unprecedented problems requires a legal system capable of fluidity
and pliancy. Our society would be strait-jacketed were not the
courts, with the able assistance of the lawyers, constantly overhaul-
ing the law and adapting it to the realities of ever-changing social,
industrial and political conditions.
J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 12-13 (1930). See also A. BICKEL, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 20 (1970); Llewellyn, The Consti-
tution as an Institution, 34 COLuM. L. REV. 1, 10-15 (1934).
188 Congress has never been found to have exceeded its broad constitutional
authority under the Property Clause, see note 185 infra, but there may be at
least hypothetical limits, even in the area of land dispositions. Justice Black
had "trouble also in thinking Congress could sell or give away the Atlantic or
Pacific Oceans." Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 280 (1954) (dissenting opin-
ion). Professor Sax has asked whether a national park, such as the Grand Can-
yon, could be sold to private parties. Sax, supra note 15, at 480.
I" E.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); see text accompanying notes
100-108 supra.
188 E.g., Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273-74, 277 (1954) (per curiam). In
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), the Court stated, "[Wihile the
furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet
been definitely resolved, we have repeatedly observed that '[t]he power over
the public lands thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.'" Id. at 539.
This language should probably not be taken literally. The 10th Amendment
may provide some limits, see Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the
Equal Footing Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. Rv. 817, 828-33 (1980), and a rational
basis test is likely to be employed, as it has been in other areas, if Congress
exercises extraordinary powers. Wilkinson, The Field of Public Land Law:
Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, 1 PuB. LAND L. REV. 1, 11-
13 (1980). Thus hypothetical actions, such as the adoption of national probate
or child welfare laws applying to all the public lands, would probably be struck
down, either as infringing on states' rights under the 10th Amendment or as
exceeding the ambit of the Property Clause. See also note 183 supra, sug-
gesting limits on extraordinary dispositions. But it is difficult to imagine con-
gressional authority being limited in the area of resource management in any
practical way.
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cal and policy-oriented for the courts to review.1 6 Thus, even if
the public trust doctrine does have constitutional dimensions,
the result is not likely to be that statutes would be overturned
by the courts. Nevertheless, a constitutionally based public trust
doctrine can make a difference, as will be discussed below.
B. A Limitation on Federal Agencies
The public trust could also operate as a limitation on the dis-
cretion of administrative agencies. First, it might be used, as it
has been in several states,18 7 to require express legislative au-
thority when public resources are being unreasonably used by
administrative agencies to promote private gain. Second, it
would provide the basis for an ultimate "hard look" doctrine for
reviewing administrative action.'" As such, it would be a doc-
trine advanced by environmentalists and by industry and would
have no ideological content. The doctrine could be invoked by
industry, for example, to emphasize the high standard of care
incumbent on the Forest Service if it mishandled a timber sale,
or on the BLM if it unreasonably delayed the processing of com-
petitive bidding on a mineral lease.
Several of the major public lands cases in the last decade have
used trust language to reach results sharply curtailing adminis-
trative discretion. The Alaska Pipeline case,189 the Mononga-
hela case,190 the Georges Bank case,1 91 and the Redwood Na-
186 See Wilkinson, supra note 185, at 24.
182 See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal.
3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980).
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
18 See, e.g., W. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 177-80.
189 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 891 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
19 West Virginia Div. of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522
F.2d 945, 955 (4th Cir. 1975).
19' Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979). This case involved
a prime fishing and oil-drilling area off the New England coast. The United
States exerted control over the area under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (Supp. II 1978), subject to multiple-use policies
similar to those covering inland public land. The issue in the case was the
nature of the duty of the Department of Interior on the continental shelf. The
court cited the Redwood National Park cases and characterized the Secretary
as the "guardian" of the public domain. 594 F.2d at 890. In summary, the court
said:
The task [of balancing interests] is committed to the Secretary,
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tional Park cases'92 are leading examples. In each of these cases,
the trust language was used only as a backdrop; the Redwood
National Park decisions could have been based on separate
grounds,"" and in the other decisions the trust was mentioned
only briefly. But the invocation of the trust concept served to set
a general context for the litigation and provided a benchmark
with which to measure the obligations of the, administrative
agencies.
C. A Rule of Construction
The public trust doctrine could also well serve the public
lands as a rule of construction.1" Let us assume that the doc-
trine is bottomed in the Property Clause19 5 or that Congress has
and so long as he carries it out rationally and in conformity to the
law, the courts may not intervene. There can be no question, how-
ever, that his legal duty embraces a solemn responsibility to see
that the great life systems of the ocean are not unreasonably jeop-
ardized by activities undertaken to extract oil and gas from the
seabed.
Id. at 892. Recognizing that Congress views wildlife as a resource entitled to
equal dignity with leasable minerals, id. at 889, the court remanded for further
agency consideration of the granting of oil leases. While trust notions were not
the sole basis for the court's holding, the general trust language plainly was
used to set a high standard for judicial review.
191 See notes 62-79 and accompanying text supra.
193 See text accompanying notes 69-75 supra.
9 Examples of court-made rules of construction are legion. See, e.g., Wil-
kinson, supra note 185, at 22. On the necessary power of federal judges to de-
velop federal common law, see note 139 supra. Several public trust doctrine
cases in the state courts have invoked rules of construction that are highly
protective of public resources. See Johnson, supra note 158, this issue at 233.
In public land law, judicially developed canons of construction have been
employed to construe the homestead laws liberally in favor of entrymen, see,
e.g., Stewart v. Penny, 238 F. Supp. 821, 831 (D. Nev. 1965), and to presume
congressional acquiescence to executive withdrawals of land. See, e.g., Portland
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F. Supp. 859 (D. Wyo. 1977). Rules of construc-
tion have also been utilized to develop the fundamental principle that federal
grants will be construed in favor of the United States. See, e.g., Andrus v.
Charlestone Stone Prod. Inc., 436 U.S. 604 (1978); United States v. Union Pac.
R.R., 353 U.S. 112 (1957); United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 911 (1978). But see Leo Sheep Co. v. United
States, 440 U.S. 668, 682-83 (1979) (Court declined to apply rule with full vigor
because railroad grants are "quasi-public" and stand on a higher plane than
private grants).
195 See notes 175-186 and accompanying text supra.
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adopted the doctrine as a matter of policy.1"' If either is true,
then all public lands statutes should be read in light of the trust
obligation. Legislation should be construed in a manner consis-
tent with Congress' intent to protect the public resources. If
there are unresolved questions on the face of the statutes, courts
should assume that Congress intended to protect and preserve
the public resources as a trustee would.
The construction of statutes against the background of a duty
to the public would affect the interpretation of a number of stat-
utes. For example, the question of impliedly reserved water
rights has been largely resolved on National Forest lands,17 but
the extent of protection afforded to wildlife and public recrea-
tional and aesthetic opportunities by other land-management
systems has not been determined.198 The courts may also have to
decide whether or not existing statutes are broad enough to au-
thorize federal land agencies to establish minimum stream flows,
based on non-reserved rights with a recent priority date as of
the date of the designation, in states that do not allow for the
setting of instream flows. 1" And while the Supreme Court has
held that federal agencies do not have the reserved right to con-
struct rights of way across patented private lands to reach
checkerboarded public lands without payment of compensa-
tion,100 the right of the public to hike across such lands to use
federal lands seems not to have been resolved; the question is
whether or not the statutes authorizing transfers to private par-
ties impliedly reserved a right of access to the public for hiking,
mining, fishing, ranching or hunting.201 Finally, major federal
statutes, such as the Taylor Grazing Act,02 have not been con-
strued to determine whether or not subsurface mineral rights
under patented land remain in federal ownership. 03 The an-
'" See notes 130-134 and accompanying text supra.
197 United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
I'l E.g., FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE, BuREAu OF RECLAMATION & THE BuREAu OF LAND MANAGE-
MENT, 86 I.D. 553 (1979).
I" E.g., Note, Federal Acquisition of Non-Reserved Water Rights After
New Mexico, 31 STAN. L. REV. 885 (1979).
10o Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
20' See Wilkinson, supra note 185, at 33.
SOS 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1976).
SOS See Ames, The Expansion of Mineral Reservations in Federal Pat-
ents-The Taylor Grazing Act's Exchange Provisions, 6 J. CoNmTim. L. 93
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swers to all of these questions would be affected if the courts
construed the acts to effectuate Congress' intent to act as a trus-
tee charged with the duty of protecting and preserving the pub-
lic resources.204
D. An Action-Forcing Mechanism
Another use of the public trust doctrine in regard to public
lands is what might be called the action-forcing cases. The in-
junction in the Redwood National Park litigation, for example,
went beyond prohibitory commands; the court also required the
agency to take affirmative action to protect the park's re-
sources.20 5 In Sierra Club v. Andrus,s"s the plaintiff sought an
order, which the district court denied, requiring the Department
of Interior to appear in state administrative proceedings to as-
sert federal reserved water rights. As pressures from population
and development have increased, several other instances have
arisen in which public lands and resources have been jeopard-
ized by private actions.00 7 The questions arise whether public
land managers can be compelled to take affirmative action, in-
cluding litigation, to protect federal lands, and whether the pub-
lic trust doctrine can play a part in such determinations.
Take, for example, the recent case in Montana involving an
Anaconda Aluminum smelter.2 0 8 The smelter, which was located
in Columbia Falls, was emitting 4,000 pounds of fluoride pollu-
tants a day. The maximum under Montana state law was 800
pounds of fluoride pollutants a day, but the state had granted a
variance and had waived the ceiling for this particular smelter.
Federal studies showed that the emissions had killed trees and
other vegetation in Glacier National Park and Flathead National
(1979).
£04 One court has already used the public trust doctrine in reaching the con-
clusion that the public has access to mining claims located after the passage of
the Surface Resources Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-612 (1976). United States
v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1980).
'o6 See notes 63-68 and accompanying text supra.
so 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C.) appeal docketed, No. 80-1674 (D.C. Cir., June
18, 1980); see notes 80-91 and accompanying text supra.
See Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of
Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. Rnv. 239 (1976); G. COGGINS & C. WMKINSON,
supra note 27, at 730-56.
'08 United States v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., No. 78-80-M (D. Mont., filed Jan.
3, 1979).
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Forest 09 and that the dead trees constituted a fire hazard. 10
Federal officials also claimed that the pollution injured wildlife
on the federal lands by causing skeletal fractures, tooth disinte-
gration and severe fluorosis .21
The United States requested that the pollutant emissions be
reduced, but Anaconda refused. The United States sued, seeking
an order that the daily pollutants be reduced to 200 pounds a
day.212 After the court issued a memorandum opinion ruling on
some of the issues,13 the case was settled. 1
Suppose, however, that the United States had refused to move
against the Anaconda smelter and that various users of the
Montana public lands had brought suit to require the United
States to take action against Anaconda. Such a procedural set-
ting may be increasingly common in years to come. On one
hand, administrative officials are afforded broad prosecutorial
discretion, and a decision not to institute suit will ordinarily be
upheld by the courts.1 5 Presumably, however, the courts would
give considerably greater scrutiny if the National Park Service,
Forest Service and Justice Department were viewed as trustees.
In fact, the trust obligation in Indian law has been the basis for
ordering the government to sue or take other action when Indian
trust resources were jeopardized.216 The Anaconda situation also
serves as a reminder of the public to whom the duty is owed:
affected members of the public would include not only recrea-
200 Complaint at 2, id.
210 Id. at 3.
211 Id.
12 Two hundred pounds a day was more stringent than the applicable re-
quirements of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976), but the United
States proceeded on a nuisance theory, arguing that its common law nuisance
rights had not been taken away by the Clean Air Act.
See Opinion and Order (Nov. 1, 1979), discussed in note 217 infra.
11 Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, id. (Aug. 4, 1980).
215 See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
,16 See, e.g., Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528
F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975) (United States ordered to file suit or take other action
to protect tribal land claim under 25 U.S.C. § 177 when statute of limitations
was about to run); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F.
Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973) (Secretary of Interior ordered to take action to pro-
tect tribal water rights). See also Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Department of Health, Education & Welfare ordered to
commence enforcement actions, and take other action, against school districts
not in compliance with laws relating to racial desegregation). See generally
Note, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 131 (1975).
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tionists but also commercial concessionaires in Glacier National
Park and timber companies and grazers dependent upon the
trees and forage in Flathead National Forest. The public trust
doctrine could thus serve as a mechanism for requiring active
administrative protection of resources that serve many different
segments of the public.'1 7
CONCLUSION
The public trust doctrine is rooted in the precept that some
resources are so central to the well-being of the community that
they must be protected by distinctive, judge-made principles.
This is an accepted process in our law: Anglo-American jurispru-
dence is rife with judicially developed doctrines that reflect the
deeply held convictions of our society. In natural resources law
generally, the unique qualities of some resources have impelled
courts to apply the public trust doctrine as a flexible, loosely
connected set of rules that allow maximum public utilization.
The increasing use of trust language in public lands cases indi-
cates an awareness that the special values of the federal lands,
like other resources on which the trust has been impressed, have
been gradually but indelibly imprinted on our national
consciousness.
The public trust doctrine does not exist to allow judges to act
as roving ambassadors on behalf of a "public" consisting mainly
of environmentalists. Rather, the doctrine protects the resources
themselves. To be sure, application of the public trust doctrine
may prohibit development of a resource by a single private com-
mercial entity, but that result allows the resource to remain
"' The public trust doctrine could also operate in the Anaconda situation as
a canon of construction affecting the merits of the case. The substantive ques-
tion in the litigation was whether the Government's common law nuisance
cause of action against Anaconda's emissions survived the passage of the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976). The district court, employing the rule
that preexisting federal rights will not impliedly be abrogated by subsequent
legislation, held that the Clean Air Act did not extinguish the common law
nuisance remedy. Opinion and Order, United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
No. 78-80-M, at 5-7 (D. Mont. Nov. 1, 1979). The court could have reinforced
this reasoning by noting that Congress, as a trustee, has a duty to act protec-
tively and with due care toward the public lands, see notes 194-204 and accom-
panying text supra, and that Congress would not have intended to eliminate
the existing nuisance cause of action since to do so would damage the public
lands and resources.
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open for use by a much wider range of interests-commercial
and non-commercial. In Illinois Central, for example, the water-
front resource did not pass to the railroad but was preserved for
a diverse public that included commercial shipping and fishing
interests as well as recreationists.
So viewed, the public trust doctrine has a measured, carefully
delineated role to play in public land law. The doctrine does not
prohibit the transfer of public lands, but the limitation on trans-
fers is only one branch of the doctrine. The trust concept can be
useful as a backdrop for judicial decisionmaking, as an aid in
determining legislative intent and as a yardstick in assessing
administrative action or inaction.
Operating in this fashion, courts are not called upon to act
according to some ill-defined "public interest." The focus of the
doctrine is on the resources themselves. Such a value-neutral
approach is but one component in the body of statutory and
common law rules designed to bring wisdom and care to the
stewardship of the federal lands and resources.
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